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MOTIVATING CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE
Erica Hashimoto*
Abstract
Some constitutional rights of criminal defendants lend themselves to
systematic violations at the trial level. In particular, state officials may
gravitate toward such violations when (1) the nature of the relevant right
renders violations difficult to detect at the trial level, and (2)
constitutional compliance imposes especially high costs. For rights with
those two characteristics, a trial-level remedy may not adequately protect
the right, and a robust appellate remedy may be necessary to provide an
adequate incentive for constitutional compliance. But because the Court
has not considered the importance of deterring constitutional violations
outside of the exclusionary rule context, it has significantly limited the
availability of appellate remedies. As a result, states have an incentive to
violate these high-cost constitutional rights in situations where the
violation is unlikely to be discovered. The Strickland right to effective
assistance of counsel provides a paradigmatic, and widespread, example
of the breakdown in remedies where constitutional violations are both
hidden at the trial level and cost effective for state actors.
This Article argues that as to this category of constitutional violations,
the Court should reformulate remedies to foster meaningful compliance
with critical constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants.
At the very least, the Court should put in place strengthened remedies if
the defendant can establish that a state both has abridged a constitutional
right and has a custom of doing so. Only by embracing this new remedial
approach can the Court close the gap between its articulation of
theoretical individual rights and the real-world incentives of states to
violate certain constitutional rights.
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INTRODUCTION
State officials, including law enforcement officers and prosecutors,
have significant incentives to respect many constitutional rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants because the U.S. Supreme Court has
created costly remedies for violating those rights. Because many
constitutional violations can be easily detected, trial-level remedies
provide a sufficient incentive for state actors to comply with those rights.
But trial-level remedies may be insufficient to deter violations of highcost constitutional rights that are difficult to detect, such as violations of
the right to effective assistance of counsel or the right to a fair and
impartial jury. And because the Court has only considered the importance
of deterring constitutional violations in the context of the exclusionary
rule, it has provided little in the way of appellate remedies for trial-level
violations of constitutional rights.
The Court has specifically tailored the exclusionary rule remedy to
provide law enforcement officers with an incentive to comply with
defendants’ constitutional rights.1 To put it another way, the Court has
1. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (noting that the exclusionary
rule “operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
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provided trial courts with the capacity to remove any incentive for law
enforcement to violate constitutional rights by eliminating any benefit
law enforcement might gain from such violations.2 Because this remedy
focuses exclusively on motivating compliance with constitutional rights,
the Court has limited it to situations in which providing a remedy will
have the greatest probability of deterring constitutional violations.3 Thus,
the Court has created exceptions to the exclusionary rule for situations in
which the remedy “does not result in appreciable deterrence.”4
By contrast, the Court has never explicitly considered the importance
of deterring constitutional errors that occur during the trial process itself.
Most of these errors, however, generally are readily correctable at the trial
level. After all, defense counsel can object to the violation of most of
these rights, and trial courts can either prevent or correct any
constitutional error. As to these rights, the primary incentive for
compliance lies in the fact that state actors recognize the likelihood that
constitutional error will be corrected—occasionally at significant cost to
the case—thereby eliminating any potential benefit to the state from the
error and providing an affirmative incentive for constitutional
compliance.5 The perceived adequacy of that structure assuring
generally through its deterrent effect’”); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (noting
that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful
police conduct’” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule prohibiting admission at trial of
unconstitutionally seized evidence applies to the states).
2. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (concluding that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule “is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it”).
3. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (observing that “[a]s with any remedial device, the
application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served”).
4. Janis, 428 U.S. at 454; accord Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (holding that providing a remedy
where law enforcement officers acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant that later proved
to be defective would not provide any incentive to comply with the Constitution because the
officers had believed that they were in compliance).
5. For instance, if the state introduces a testimonial hearsay statement against a defendant
in clear violation of her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, see Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004), that error will be obvious to defense counsel and the trial
judge, making it unlikely that the prosecutor will gain any benefit from violating the right. In
addition, because the trial judge could grant a mistrial based upon the constitutional violation,
prosecutors have an affirmative incentive to comply with the constitutional right. Cf. Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128–37 (1968) (rejecting the argument that “the right to
confrontation could be avoided by the instruction to the jury to disregard the inadmissible hearsay
evidence” based on the “threats to a fair trial” inherent in the admission of a co-defendant’s
extrajudicial confession); United States v. Doherty, 233 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
admission of such testimony is error precisely because ‘the jury can [not] possibly be expected to
forget it in assessing the defendant’s guilt.’” (alteration in original)).
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constitutional compliance before trial courts has prevented the Court
from explicitly considering the importance of providing an incentive for
constitutional compliance.6
Because the Court has not considered the importance of providing
incentives for constitutional compliance in the context of these rights,
appellate remedies have been limited to instances in which the fairness of
the proceedings and the reliability of the outcome have been
compromised.7 For most constitutional rights, this remedial scheme
provides sufficient incentives for constitutional compliance to prevent
widespread violations of constitutional rights.8 But not for all. One
particular category of rights arising after initiation of trial court
proceedings has both escaped remedy and been subject to systemic
violations. This category includes rights with two distinctive
characteristics: (1) violations are hidden (or at the very least not obvious)
at the trial court level, and (2) they are high-cost rights, or, to put it
another way, the state has strong incentives to violate them. For this
category of constitutional rights, trial courts cannot sufficiently
incentivize constitutional compliance, and a more robust appellate
remedy therefore is needed. But because the Court has never recognized
the importance of deterrence for these violations, remedies have remained
elusive.
The right to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington9 provides a paradigmatic example.10 The Court held in
Strickland that defendants have a constitutional right not only to counsel
but also to the effective assistance of counsel.11 But these ineffective
assistance errors tend to remain hidden at the trial level. After all, defense
lawyers have little to no incentive, or perhaps lack the self-awareness, to
raise their own ineffectiveness. Because defense counsel serve as the

6. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (“[B]ecause we presume that the
lawyer is competent to provide the guiding hand that the defendant needs, the burden rests on the
accused to demonstrate a constitutional violation.” (internal citation omitted)).
7. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
8. To be sure, this remedial scheme, which provides only limited remedies for
constitutional rights, has been the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced
Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 172 (1991) (observing that “even the accused have rights
and that only automatic reversal can fully vindicate such rights”). Broader remedies likely would
incentivize greater constitutional compliance, but most constitutional rights do not lend
themselves to widespread, systematic violations, and the current remedial scheme likely assures
compliance with many rights.
9. 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 685–86.
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primary protectors of their clients’ rights,12 a lawyer’s failure to function
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment likely will go unnoticed at
the trial level. In addition, providing effective assistance of counsel to all
defendants who are entitled to counsel is an incredibly expensive
proposition for state and local jurisdictions.13 As a result, local and state
jurisdictions have strong incentives to cut corners on indigent defense if
they think there will be no consequence to those decisions.
Because the Court, in crafting appellate remedies for constitutional
rights that arise after the initiation of criminal proceedings, has focused
entirely on fair trial concerns, it has never considered the importance of
12. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 732 (2007) (“There is,
perhaps, no right as fundamental to the defendant as the right to have the assistance of an effective
attorney, because that attorney is the conduit through which all other constitutional rights are
asserted.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 93 (1995) (“Nevertheless, . . . attorneys were taught to keep in
sight one central goal, namely, to provide the best possible representation for each client by
ensuring that all his constitutional rights were vindicated throughout the criminal justice
process.”).
13. States vary regarding the entity that has to provide the funding for indigent defense
systems. In some states, the state itself funds indigent defense. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL
COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 53 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE
DENIED] (“[T]he majority of states (28) now essentially fully fund indigent defense (i.e., provide
more than 90% of the funding).”); State Indigent Defense Systems, SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. (last
visited July 1, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/the-right-to-counsel/state-indigent-defensesystems/ (listing the percentage of state funding for indigent defense in every state as of 2013). In
other jurisdictions, states provide some of the funding and local or county jurisdictions provide
the rest. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra, at 54 (“Five states provide between 50% and 85% of the
funds required for indigent defense, and 16 states shift the burden of over half the funding to the
counties.”); see also Justine Finney Guyer, Note, Saving Missouri’s Public Defender System: A
Call for Adequate Legislative Funding, 74 MO. L. REV. 335, 342 (2009) (noting that while
Missouri’s public defender system is technically state funded, counties are responsible for funding
public defender office space and utilities). Additionally, in a handful of jurisdictions, primary
responsibility for indigent defense representation still lies with local or county jurisdictions. See
JUSTICE DENIED, supra, at 54 & n.31 (noting that while only two states require counties to fund
all indigent defense expenses, an additional six states contribute less than ten percent of indigent
defense funding); see also Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality
and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 242–43 (2010) (explaining that
most of the funding for indigent defense in Arizona comes from county general funds). Finally,
in many states, local jurisdictions are responsible for providing counsel in misdemeanor cases,
particularly local code offenses although sometimes also for state misdemeanors. See, e.g., HOLLY
R. STEVENS ET AL., STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 28 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/leg
al_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that in
Kansas, the state funds felony criminal defense, but counties provide the funding for misdemeanor
and juvenile cases).
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providing a remedy to motivate constitutional compliance.14 In particular,
the Court has limited the appellate remedy for Strickland violations to
defendants who can establish a reasonable probability of a different result
absent counsel’s errors.15 The result has been widespread violations of
the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at the trial
level.16
To be sure, most jurisdictions comply with their constitutional
obligations. But not every jurisdiction does. And the problem is that the
criminal justice system relies primarily (if not exclusively) on the good
faith of state or local governmental actors operating within the system.
None of the other potential external mechanisms for assuring
constitutional compliance—federal habeas; the federal civil damages
remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; state habeas and tort remedies; and
ethical rules—adequately affect the conduct of governmental officials.
Because this particular category of constitutional rights defies
constitutional compliance, this Article argues that the Court should create
a more robust appellate remedy in certain cases. In jurisdictions that have
demonstrated disregard for a constitutional right, the Court should require
a reversal remedy where a defendant can establish (1) that the state did
not comply with its constitutional obligations and (2) that the state had a
custom of violating this constitutional right. Such a remedy would
provide state actors with an incentive for constitutional compliance that
has been absent in the past.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the exclusionary
rule and its deterrent effect. Part II identifies a category of constitutional
rights that lend themselves to widespread, systematic violations and
focuses on the importance of deterring those constitutional violations.
Part III discusses the ineffectiveness of other remedies that might
incentivize constitutional compliance. Finally, Part IV proposes a
remedial modification for this category of constitutional rights—
specifically, a new systemic remedy for the failure to comply with the
Constitution when there is evidence of a custom of constitutional noncompliance.
I. DETERRENCE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Supreme Court has recognized that certain constitutional rights—
the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unconstitutional searches
and seizures, the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and the Sixth
14. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85.
15. Id. at 694.
16. See infra Section II.B (discussing the result of limiting appellate remedies for
constitutional errors).
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Amendment right to counsel during interrogation—would mean little
absent some mechanism for enforcing those rights. In crafting those
remedies, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
deterring unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officers. 17 It
therefore has designed a remedial scheme to incentivize law enforcement
to comply with constitutional requirements.18 In particular, the Court has
tailored the exclusionary rule to provide incentives for state actors
(primarily law enforcement officers) to respect defendants’ constitutional
rights.19
17. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (“[T]he exclusionary rule was
historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct . . . .”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 263 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful
searches by police.”); see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic
Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 53 (2010) (“The benefit of deterring police misconduct was not among the
original justifications presented for the exclusionary rule in Weeks. . . . [H]owever,
deterrence . . . is now considered the only benefit and purpose of the exclusionary rule.”); Ruth
W. Grant, The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 173, 181–84 (1991) (describing the rise of the deterrence rationale in the Court’s decisions
concerning the exclusionary rule); James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of
Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819, 1858–59 (2008) (“The prevailing
understanding of the exclusionary rule is that it is a constitutionally required deterrent of future
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the accepted wisdom, the rule eliminates
incentives for illegality by denying officers the profits of their illegal acts.” (internal citation
omitted)).
The Court has treated statements slightly differently than searches, holding that the
constitutional violation in cases where law enforcement has failed to comply with the Fourth
Amendment’s requirements occurs at the time of the illegal search, whereas the constitutional
violation in cases in which police fail to comply with Miranda occurs when any statement is
introduced in evidence against the defendant at trial. See Richard M. Re, The Due Process
Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1912–13 (2014) (explaining that a suspect’s Fourth
Amendment rights are infringed at the time the police conduct an unconstitutional search and the
suspect’s due process rights are infringed if the fruits of the unconstitutional search are later relied
on by a court to impose a conviction); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (explaining
that a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause does not occur until
statements compelled by police interrogation are used against a defendant at trial because a
defendant is not made to be a “witness” against himself in violation of the Clause if his statements
are never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case).
18. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 608 (2006) (holding that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty . . . by removing the
incentive to disregard it” (alteration in original) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
217 (1960))); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (“[T]he right to be secure
against searches and seizures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since the officers are
themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of court.”).
19. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to
the states); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S 383, 398 (1914) (approving the implementation of
the exclusionary rule in federal trials); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976)
(noting that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future
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Because the exclusionary rule has focused on providing law
enforcement with an incentive to comply with the Constitution, the Court
has not hesitated to recognize exceptions where the existence of a remedy
is unlikely to deter unconstitutional conduct.20 In short, the Court has
tailored the exclusionary rule to provide relief only where necessary to
deter unconstitutional conduct. To be sure, the exclusionary rule has been
roundly criticized as ineffective because of these exceptions. But
empirical evidence suggests that the availability of these remedies at least
correlates with constitutional compliance by law enforcement officers.
A. Incentives for Constitutional Law Enforcement Conduct
The Supreme Court has recognized that remedies deter law
enforcement officers from violating the rights of suspects in their
custody.21 For the past fifty years, the exclusionary rule—which prevents
the state from introducing evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against
being compelled to be a witness against oneself and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during interrogation—has been the primary
means of deterring unconstitutional law enforcement conduct.22
Justifying a remedy for violations of these constitutional rights
presented the Court with a dilemma.23 For instance, although defendants
unlawful police conduct’” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484–85 (1976) (emphasizing that the judicial integrity policy reasoning
for the exclusionary rule plays a “limited role . . . in the determination [of] whether to apply the
rule in a particular context”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (emphasizing
the exclusionary rule’s purpose to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925–26 (1984) (recognizing the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980)
(recognizing the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 261–64 (1962) (establishing the standing exception to the exclusionary rule).
21. See, e.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 281, 286–87 (1988) (observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized
the shortcomings of traditional tort remedies—and has accordingly embraced deterrent remedies”
involving the violation of constitutional rights by law enforcement); see also Grant, supra note
17, at 179–80 (noting that eight members of the Court had accepted the deterrent rationale by
1949).
22. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772 (noting that the Court has “established the Miranda
exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text
of the Self–Incrimination Clause”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475–76 (1966) (holding
that the right to counsel during interrogation is a “prerequisite[] to the admissibility of any
statement made by a defendant”); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule
to bar evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment).
23. See Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal
Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638 (1982) (asserting that the rule was originally adopted because
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have a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, evidence that law enforcement seizes as a result of
unconstitutional searches or seizures does not raise concerns of unreliable
evidence being introduced against defendants. Instead, the
unconstitutionally seized evidence very likely is perfectly reliable—and
often compelling—evidence of the defendant’s guilt.24 But as the Court
recognized in Weeks v. United States25 and Mapp v. Ohio,26 law
enforcement officers seeking to amass evidence for use in prosecuting
defendants have strong incentives to ensure that they gather the most
compelling evidence.27 If illegally seized evidence or illegally obtained
statements were admissible, law enforcement officers would have every
incentive to illegally collect that evidence and take those statements.
Recognizing the importance of ensuring that law enforcement
officials have at least some incentive to respect the constitutional rights
of defendants in their custody, the Court created the exclusionary rule to
remedy constitutional violations, prohibiting the introduction of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence against criminal defendants at their
trials.28 Of course, if defendants whose rights were violated had other
remedies—for instance a robust remedy through a civil action in tort—
then that could provide an incentive for law enforcement to comply with
“there was no alternative sanction for violations of the [F]ourth [A]mendment that did not cause
severe underdeterrence,” but arguing from a law and economics perspective that the exclusionary
rule “imposes a deadweight loss—the suppression of socially valuable evidence” and “produces
overdeterrence”).
24. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) (identifying the cost of the
exclusionary rule as the “grave adverse consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating
evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into society)”); Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (“Because the exclusionary rule precludes
consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it imposes significant costs: It undeniably detracts
from the truthfinding process and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape
the consequences of their actions.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“Each time the
exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth
Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for
truth at trial is deflected.”).
25. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
26. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656–57.
27. See id. at 656 (noting that officers have an incentive to disregard the constitutional
guarantee); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (acknowledging “[t]he tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions”).
28. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by [the authority of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments], inadmissible
in a state court.”). In addition to deterring unconstitutional conduct, some scholars have argued
that the exclusionary rule also prevents courts from admitting and legitimizing illegally seized
evidence. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1562 (1972).
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the Constitution. But no such robust remedy exists.29 As a result, the
exclusionary rule remedy operates fundamentally, and virtually
exclusively, to provide law enforcement officers with an incentive to
respect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
B. Incentive-Based Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Because the Court understood that the exclusionary rule provides
incentives for constitutional compliance, it has limited the remedy to
situations most likely to lead to such compliance.30 Exploring a couple of
these remedial limitations—the good faith exception and the direct result
limitation—in greater depth further demonstrates the shaping of law
enforcement incentives as the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous of the exclusionary rule exceptions, the
“good faith” exception precludes a remedy if law enforcement officers
had a good faith belief that they were complying with the Constitution.31
In United States v. Leon,32 law enforcement officers conducted a search
pursuant to a warrant obtained from a magistrate.33 The district court and
court of appeals later concluded that the magistrate had erred in finding
probable cause and therefore held the warrant invalid.34 Emphasizing the
exclusionary rule’s focus on incentivizing constitutional behavior, the
Supreme Court concluded that if the officers executing the warrant had
no way of knowing that the warrant later would be deemed invalid,
excluding evidence seized pursuant to the warrant would not in any way
incentivize constitutional conduct.35 Indeed, only the magistrate’s
conduct in issuing the warrant could conceivably be “deterred” by
excluding the evidence seized, since only the magistrate arguably
engaged in the “wrongful” conduct of issuing a warrant on less than
probable cause.36 But because there was no evidence either that a
magistrate judge was intentionally issuing invalid warrants or that the
exclusionary rule would affect his determinations of probable cause, the
Court held that the exclusionary rule did not serve a sufficient purpose
under these circumstances.37
29. See infra Section III.B (describing the limitations of the tort remedy provided by 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
30. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 679–86 (2011) (discussing the Court’s retrenchment of
the exclusionary rule remedy).
31. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925–26 (1984).
32. Id. at 922–23.
33. Id. at 902.
34. Id. at 903–05.
35. Id. at 919–21.
36. Id. at 916.
37. Id. at 916–17.
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In the years since the Court created the good faith exception, the Court
has significantly expanded it to include not just searches undertaken
pursuant to a warrant but also warrantless searches.38 For instance, the
Court has held that the good faith exception covers evidence seized in a
warrantless search undertaken in reliance on precedent that permitted the
search at the time but that later was deemed unconstitutional.39 Similarly,
the Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to warrantless
searches conducted either pursuant to a subsequently invalidated statute40
or on the basis of erroneous information about a pending warrant in a
database.41 The wisdom of the good faith exception has been hotly
disputed,42 but the reasoning behind it makes sense if the primary purpose
of the exclusionary rule remedy is incentivizing constitutional
compliance.
The Court also has relied on the importance of incentivizing
constitutional compliance in holding that the exclusionary rule bars
admission only of evidence that directly resulted from the
unconstitutional conduct.43 When the constitutional violation did not
directly procure the evidence, law enforcement officers would be much
less likely to understand the evidentiary consequences and respond
accordingly in the future. In New York v. Harris,44 for example, the police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant, but because they arrested him
38. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011).
39. Id.
40. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987).
41. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,
14–16 (1995).
42. See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 934 (1986) (condemning the
Court’s reasoning in Leon as treating the Fourth Amendment as nothing but an “advisory norm”).
Despite his harsh criticism of the Leon opinion, however, Professor Donald Dripps believes that
where the police obtain a warrant, there will almost always be probable cause and that an appellate
court generally should not second-guess that probable cause determination. Id. at 941–42; see also
Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Court’s claim that
punishing negligence will not achieve deterrence flouts a most basic premise of tort law); Wayne
R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the
Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009) (criticizing every aspect of
the Court’s decision to extend the good faith exception to cases where the Fourth Amendment
violation is the result of “negligence attenuated from the arrest”).
43. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (declining to apply the
exclusionary rule where the connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and the
incriminating evidence is sufficiently attenuated). The Court is more likely to find such
attenuation if the violation led to discovery of a witness rather than an object. Id. at 280; see also
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1979) (listing factors to be considered in the
attenuation analysis and explaining that where the official misconduct leads more directly to
evidence, the exclusionary rule should apply both to deter misconduct and to maintain the integrity
of the courts).
44. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
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in his house without a warrant, they violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.45 After his arrest, the officers took the defendant to the police
station where he confessed to the crime.46 The question before the Court
was whether the conceded Fourth Amendment violation—the warrantless
arrest of the defendant in his house—should result in the exclusion at trial
of the station house statement.47
The Court first held that the police had the defendant in lawful custody
at the time he made the statement because they had probable cause for his
arrest, and the Fourth Amendment violation concerned only the
circumstances of his arrest (in his house rather than on the street).48
Because his statement did not directly result from unlawful custody, “the
incremental deterrent value [from excluding evidence] would be
minimal.”49 The Court contrasted these facts with a situation in which
officers illegally arrested a defendant in his house and took a statement
from him in the house.50 Because the statement in that case could be
directly attributed to the officers’ unconstitutional conduct, exclusion
would have a more significant deterrent effect and therefore would
outweigh the cost to the system of suppressing the evidence.51
There are, of course, other incentive-based exceptions to the
exclusionary rule,52 and many scholars have argued that the value of the
exclusionary rule has been so diluted that it provides law enforcement
with only the most minimal incentive to comply with the Fourth and Fifth

45. Id. at 15–16.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 20–21.
52. For instance, the Court has held that defendants cannot assert claims based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of others—the so-called “standing” doctrine—grounding this
exception in the fact that law enforcement officers have little incentive to violate the rights of one
person to seek evidence against another person. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
105–06 (1980) (finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in another
person’s purse and therefore could not challenge the search of that purse); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (changing the nature of the inquiry from “standing” to substantive rights but
maintaining the same rules); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (holding that a
defendant cannot challenge the introduction of evidence that resulted from a search or seizure of
a third party). The “public safety” exception, which renders admissible statements elicited in
reasonable response to public safety concerns even without prior Miranda warnings, responds to
the balancing of the deterrent value of exclusion against the societal cost of exclusion. See New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (permitting police to question a suspect without
Miranda warnings when necessary to protect the public safety and declining to inquire into the
subjective motivation of the officers).
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Amendments.53 But even in its diluted form, because the remedial
limitations focus on the extent to which providing a remedy might affect
law enforcement conduct, the exclusionary rule has retained its core
function of providing an incentive to comply with the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendment rights.54
C. Evidence of the Incentivizing Effect of the Exclusionary Rule
The Court’s recognition of the exclusionary rule has been the subject
of abundant academic discussion over the past fifty years,55 at least some
of which has criticized both the importance and effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule as a mechanism to deter unconstitutional conduct.56 But
empirical evidence suggests that, at least in the context of Miranda v.
Arizona,57 and likely the Fourth Amendment, the conduct of law
53. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary
Rule—A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil
Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 755 (1998)
(explaining that the results of an empirical study show “[t]he exclusionary rule does not even
apply to most police misconduct, and therefore is simply inadequate as a deterrent”); see also
David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV.
7, 10 (2012) (arguing that the many exceptions to the exclusionary rule allowing admission of
illegally seized evidence in a variety of litigation forums collateral to criminal trials encourage
state and local police officers to engage in illegal searches and seizures); David A. Harris, How
Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 194 (2009) (noting that “police officers rarely if
ever suffer personal or professional consequences for disobeying Fourth Amendment rules” and
that “some substantial number of officers find it easy, or worthwhile in some way, to ignore the
exclusionary rule for what they perceive as good and sufficient reasons”).
54. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment violation triggered by police negligence did not justify application of the
exclusionary rule and reasoning that the exclusionary rule “serves to deter deliberate, reckless or
grossly negligent conduct”); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 953 (1965) (noting that “[t]he beneficent aim of the
exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can be sufficiently accomplished by a
practice . . . outlawing evidence obtained by flagrant or deliberate violation of rights” (footnotes
omitted)).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (acknowledging in
euphemistic language that “[t]he debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been
a warm one”); Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2001) (“Few debates in American law are as sustained, or as bitter, as the debate over
the exclusionary rule.”).
56. See, e.g., Bloom & Fentin, supra note 17, at 78–80 (advocating reliance on the judicial
integrity rationale); Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 821, 822 (2013) (asserting that “[a]lthough it is well accepted that the Court
now treats the exclusionary remedy as exclusively deterrence-driven, the Court has not articulated
a coherent theory explaining how it expects exclusion to deter unconstitutional searches and why
it considers deterrence a worthy goal” (footnote omitted)).
57. 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (holding that the right to counsel during interrogation is a
“prerequisite[] to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant”).
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enforcement officers corresponds to the likelihood that defendants have
a remedy.58 To be sure, the evidence is not overwhelming.59 But data at
least suggest that law enforcement officers conform their conduct to the
likelihood of a remedy.
In particular, data demonstrate that limiting the exclusionary rule
remedy results in more deliberate violations.60 Since Miranda, the Court
has created two exceptions to its exclusionary rule: (1) permitting the
state to introduce statements taken in violation of Miranda for
impeachment purposes,61 and (2) permitting law enforcement to use those
statements during their investigation.62 As Professor Charles Weisselberg
has documented, as soon as the Court allowed some use of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda, law enforcement officials began
training officers in permissible uses of the statements.63
After the Court’s decisions permitting use of statements taken in
violation of Miranda, training materials distributed to California law
enforcement officers contained explicit instructions that questioning
“outside Miranda”—after defendants have invoked their right to silence
or asked for counsel—does not violate a defendant’s rights and is
58. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442–43 (1987) (describing how the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence
incentivizes police officers to follow the law where a violation would provide the defendant a
remedy and to cross the line where no remedy is available); Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free
to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 524–25 (2002) (discussing the effect of exclusionary
rule remedies on law enforcement compliance with Miranda); Dellinger, supra note 28, at 1563
(arguing against the adoption of a tort remedy as a substitute for the exclusionary rule because it
would permit law enforcement officers to buy their way out of complying with the Constitution);
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132 (1998) (documenting the
sensitivity of police to the remedies provided for a violation of Miranda); see also Donald Dripps,
The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical
Dimensions of the Over-deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 227–28 (2010) (citing
a study of Maryland police officers that showed in 48.4% of non-consent searches pursuant to
traffic stops, the police found contraband). Professor Dripps argues that after discounting small,
personal amounts of marijuana, the “hit rate” for these searches is actually under ten percent and
that these numbers indicate that the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for warrantless
searches, but that the low “hit rate” shows that the exclusionary rule does not currently do enough
to deter illegal warrantless searches. Id. at 228.
59. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2008) (stating that it is not possible to quantify the effect of the
exclusionary rule on police behavior).
60. See Weisselberg, supra note 58, at 134–36.
61. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
62. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450–52 (1974) (holding that although the state
could not introduce against the defendant evidence of a statement law enforcement officers
obtained in violation of Miranda, the state could use the defendant’s statement to find other
witnesses against him).
63. Weisselberg, supra note 58, at 134–35.
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permissible to gain information that can be used in any way except
directly against the defendant at trial.64 As a result, “a substantial number
of appellate decisions . . . reported deliberate Miranda violations in
interrogations in counties all around the state.”65
The data are somewhat mixed regarding whether the exclusionary rule
effectively deters illegal searches and seizures, but at least some studies
have concluded that it has had a deterrent effect.66 And this makes sense.
After all, the suppression remedy requires law enforcement officers to
weigh the likelihood that the court will suppress the evidence they collect
against the potential benefit gained by violating the defendant’s
constitutional rights.67 But without any possibility of suppression, there
is no incentive to comply with those rights.
To be sure, many state actors would comply with their constitutional
responsibilities even without any incentive.68 But in the rough and tumble
of criminal prosecutions, at least some law enforcement officers believe
they have an obligation to society to build a strong case against those who
they believe have done wrong.69 To the extent that the Constitution does
not provide a remedy for actions they take, it perhaps is understandable
64. Id.
65. Id. at 136.
66. See, e.g., Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress
and “Lost Cases:” The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1065 (1991) (analyzing data from seven counties and concluding that the
exclusionary rule “serves as an incentive for many police officers to follow the limits imposed by
the Fourth Amendment” and that “police were willing to follow guidelines established by the
Constitution, the district attorney’s office, and the courts when writing search warrant
applications”). But see James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 276–77 (1973) (citing to studies of
motions to suppress and finding that “[t]he sample is small but it seems to indicate that some
police, at least, are not deterred by the exclusionary rule at all”).
67. See Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965,
1001 (2012) (contending that the Court’s exceptions to excluding evidence obtained in violation
of Miranda incentivize police misconduct). Professor Yale Kamisar points out that even if
individual police officers do not engage in this sort of economic analysis, the authors of their
training manuals will. Id.
68. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred
Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 374–75 (1997) (acknowledging that prosecutors usually obey
a constitutional ruling even if they could generally violate it without any extrinsic consequences).
69. Cf. Kinports, supra note 56, at 833–34 (discussing “organizational theory” and how it
posits that police officers have developed their own cultural norms that may result in widespread
wrongdoing without any individual officer thinking he is doing anything wrong). In an editorial
imploring citizens to provide information about a murder, columnist Mary Mitchell wrote that
police officers sometimes justify violating citizens’ rights when looking for a dangerous
perpetrator because witnesses will not “snitch,” and therefore police feel obligated to do whatever
it takes. Mary Mitchell, Who’s Helping Tinley Park Killer Hide?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008,
at A12.
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that they believe their conduct justified.70 Thus, for better or worse, the
availability of a suppression remedy has had an impact on the conduct of
law enforcement.71
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF DETERRING INVISIBLE VIOLATIONS OF HIGHCOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In contrast to the exclusionary rule remedial scheme, the Court in
devising a remedial scheme for trial-level violations of constitutional
rights has never considered the importance of providing incentives for
constitutional conduct by state actors.72 For this category of constitutional
error—occurring after the trial court has appointed counsel and taken
oversight of the case—the Court essentially has entrusted defense counsel
and trial courts with the responsibility of protecting the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.73 This may be because trial courts that have
the authority and obligation to respond to objections by the defendant can
generally correct errors that occur before the trial court—for instance,
violations of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses or
to not testify—relatively easily. And to the extent that defense counsel
can anticipate and raise a potential constitutional error, trial courts can act
to prevent that error.
Because the Court appears to assume that trial courts will correct these
errors, it has limited post-violation appellate remedies to situations where
constitutional violations deprive defendants of fundamentally fair trials.74
70. See Weisselberg, supra note 58, at 153 (noting that exceptions to the exclusionary rule
for Miranda violations have taught police officers that they should only follow the law when
necessary to avoid suppression of evidence).
71. See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 114
(2003) (stating that other than the exclusionary rule, there are almost no incentives for police to
follow the law); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1245 (2005) (arguing that exceptions to the
availability of remedies for criminal defendants causes “prosecutors and police to tailor their
actions to the sub-constitutional level”).
72. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1981) (reviewing precedent on
Sixth Amendment violations and concluding that “[the Court’s] approach has thus been to identify
and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the
defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial”).
73. Id. at 365 (reasoning that absent “some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of
counsel’s representation or . . . other prejudice to the defense. . . . there is no basis for imposing a
remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant’s right to
counsel and to a fair trial”).
74. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“In giving meaning to
the [constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel] . . . we must take its purpose—
to ensure a fair trial—as the guide.”); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986)
(recognizing that some constitutional errors require reversal because these errors “necessarily
render a trial fundamentally unfair. . . . [and w]ithout these basic protections, a criminal trial
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To be sure, trial courts do provide at least some incentive for state actors
to respect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.75 After all, the
threat of the trial court imposing a costly remedy provides an incentive
for compliance with most constitutional rights. Many constitutional
errors that occur within a trial court’s jurisdiction therefore are readily
correctable by those courts.
But there is a particular category of constitutional rights for which
remedies before the trial court are wholly inadequate to incentivize
constitutional compliance.76 State actors often have incentives—both
economic and non-economic—to err on the side of violating the
Constitution if there is no consequence to that violation. If ensuring
robust respect for those constitutional rights imposes significant costs,
states and local jurisdictions face a substantial disincentive to respect
those rights. And if trial courts cannot easily detect those constitutional
violations, states have little external incentive to comply with the
Constitution. For this particular category of rights—violations of which
are shrouded from the trial court and counsel and compliance with which
is costly—states have virtually no incentive, outside of their own moral
compass and the ethical rules, to protect these rights.77 Two rights—(1)
Strickland v. Washington’s right to the effective assistance of counsel,78
and (2) Batson v. Kentucky’s right to a fair and impartial jury79—provide

cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence”); Morrison,
449 U.S. at 365 (reasoning that absent “some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel’s
representation or . . . other prejudice to the defense. . . , there is no basis for imposing a remedy
in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant’s right to counsel
and to a fair trial”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (finding a constitutional violation
because the state court’s actions “amount[ed] to a denial of effective and substantial aid [of
counsel]”); United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that in cases involving
the alleged denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the court “must ‘identify and then
neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the
effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial’ [and that] [d]ismissal of an indictment is a remedy
of last resort”); Gregory Mitchell, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism: Constraining
Harmless Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1994) (discussing the automatic reversal
standard when an error alters the structure of a trial so much that a reliable verdict could not be
attained).
75. See supra note 5.
76. The lack of any incentive for constitutional compliance does not mean that every
jurisdiction systematically violates the rights of criminal defendants. It does, however, mean that
some jurisdictions systematically violate certain rights with no fear of repercussions.
77. By “systematic” violations, this Article refers to constitutional errors that occur
regularly and frequently in a particular jurisdiction.
78. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984).
79. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84, 96–98 (1986) (reaffirming that purposeful
exclusion of jurors based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause and establishing a burdenshifting framework for determining when a violation occurs).
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illustrative examples of invisible constitutional error and the importance
of providing appellate remedies for violations of those rights.
A. Invisible Denials of High-Cost Constitutional Rights
Although trial courts can correct many constitutional errors that occur
within their jurisdiction, certain errors are far more difficult to detect and
remedy at the trial level. This occurs either because defense counsel
cannot (or will not) identify the error or because the error lies primarily
within the knowledge of the prosecutor.80 If those invisible errors also
provide significant benefit to the state, the risk of systemic violations of
those constitutional rights increases substantially.
Violation of Strickland’s right to effective assistance of counsel is the
paradigmatic example of an error not usually raised before trial courts.
Lawyers for defendants raise most errors on behalf of their clients.81 But
trial lawyers are unlikely to recognize or raise their own ineffectiveness,
particularly when their clients are pleading guilty.82 And unless a
defendant knows to raise the lack of diligence or investigation by counsel,
trial courts often are unaware that there is a problem. Thus, appellate (or
post-conviction) counsel raise most claims that trial counsel provided
constitutionally deficient assistance in violation of the Sixth
Amendment.83 As a result, courts usually consider ineffective assistance
claims only on appeal, if at all.
Batson errors similarly may be hidden. To establish that a prosecutor
violated Batson by striking a potential juror on prohibited race or gender
grounds, defendants must show intentional discrimination by the
prosecutor; that is, that the prosecutor struck the juror because of her race
80. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678–81 (1985) (discussing different
forms of prosecutorial misconduct).
81. James A. Morrow & Joshua R. Larson, Without a Doubt, A Sharp and Radical
Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to Change Plain Error Review of
Unobjected-to Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramey, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 353 (2008)
(“[D]efense attorneys are obligated to object to prosecutorial error when it occurs and seek
corrective action by the trial court.”).
82. There are instances of court-appointed counsel asserting that they cannot be effective
because of their caseloads, but those cases are relatively rare. See, e.g., Pub. Def., Eleventh Jud.
Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 2013).
83. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 915 (1999) (pointing out that defendants tend to raise ineffective assistance of counsel
claims only on collateral review because the defendant typically retains his trial lawyer on direct
appeal). In some states, defendants cannot bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal and can only raise them in collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132
S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (holding that procedural default does not prevent collateral review of an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in Arizona because a defendant could bring such a
claim only on collateral review when the defendant did not have right to counsel).
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or gender.84 Of course, prosecutors likely possess evidence regarding
why they struck particular jurors and whether they intended to exclude
jurors from a defendant’s jury on prohibited grounds. But other than the
facts in the particular case—that the prosecutor struck most of the people
of color or women from the jury—defendants often have little evidence
that a particular prosecutor has engaged in intentional discrimination.85
Each of these constitutional rights, moreover, carries an elevated risk
of systemic violations. This is so either because of the high cost of
complying with these rights or because of entrenched views on the
benefits of not complying with defendants’ rights.86 Of course, almost
every constitutional right imposes at least some cost on the state insofar
as it reduces the likelihood of a conviction.87 But the cost—either
financial or in terms of workload—of respecting some constitutional
rights is higher than for others.
Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel standard lends itself to
systematic violations primarily because ensuring effective assistance of
counsel for every criminal defendant has significant monetary costs for
the state.88 The state (or local jurisdiction, depending on what entity
provides counsel for indigent defendants) has a strong financial incentive
to minimize the costs of indigent defense providers (usually public
defender offices).89 As a result, many jurisdictions chronically and
84. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98 (describing the three-step burden-shifting process to
determine whether the prosecution engaged in “purposeful discrimination”).
85. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (noting that there will likely not
be much evidence bearing on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination and that “the best
evidence often will be the demeanor of the [prosecutor]”); Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable
Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279,
322 (2007) (“Batson challenges occur in a virtual evidentiary vacuum . . . .”).
86. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346
(2003).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that
advising the defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination before he enters a guilty plea
ensures that the defendant has knowingly waived this constitutional right that “reduce[s] the
likelihood of conviction”).
88. See John P. Gross, The True Benefits of Counsel: Why “Do-it-Yourself” Lawyering
Does Not Protect the Rights of the Indigent, 43 N.M. L. REV. 1, 31 n.129 (2013) (citing cases
where the Supreme Court has recognized the financial burden that the right to counsel places on
the states); Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32, 43–47 (1995) (recognizing that “[c]ost is usually the
primary factor determining what type of indigent defense system a state or county adopts” and
providing examples of state funding methods).
89. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 252 (“Legislatures, responding to voters
fearful of crime, have no incentive to devote scarce resources to the defense function rather than
to additional police or prison space.”); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s
Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2003) (arguing that the Gideon Court’s failure to
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seriously underfund their indigent defense systems.90 Public defenders in
some jurisdictions carry such enormous caseloads that they cannot
possibly provide every defendant, in the words of the Strickland Court,
the “assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”91
Indigent defense counsel carrying caseloads of 1000–1600 cases per year
cannot possibly provide effective assistance.92
Respecting Batson also involves costs for prosecutors, at least in
jurisdictions in which prosecutors believe that jurors of color will be less
likely to convict.93 Before Batson, at least some jurisdictions had explicit
policies and training to ensure that prosecutors did not seat jurors of color,

provide states with clear guidance on how to develop and fund a system of effective indigent
representation has contributed to the common practice of “jurisdictions tolerating and even
fostering minimal levels of performance”). See generally STEPHEN D. OWENS ET AL., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 246683, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES, FY 2008–2012 – UPDATED 1 (2014) (describing the various funding methods states use
to provide indigent defense and reporting the budget of each state through 2012).
90. E.g., Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive
Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 421 (2011)
(“Excessive caseloads due to the underfunding of public defenders have been the status quo for
decades . . . .”); Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers
as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 MO. L. REV. 885, 885–87 (2010) (stating that
“public indigent defense systems nationwide operate in perpetual crisis mode” and describing the
system of chronic underfunding in Florida).
91. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984); accord Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031,
1054–57 (2006) (detailing the problem of crushing caseloads for indigent defense counsel); see
also Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
461, 470–71 (2007) (providing data on caseloads of public defenders); Richard Klein, The
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 391–92 (1993) (identifying problems caused by excessive caseloads);
Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal
Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 908 (2004) (identifying excessive caseloads as one of the problems
confronting indigent defense systems in this country); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1240–
41 (1993) (noting that “staggering caseloads” lead to “burnout” among public defenders); TaylorThompson, supra note 89, at 1509 (recognizing that caseload caps are critical to quality
representation).
92. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 17 (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (“Caseloads are radically out of whack in some places in New York.
There are caseloads per year in which a lawyer handles 1,000, 1,200, 1,600 cases.” (quoting
Jonathan Gradess, Executive Director, New York State Defenders Association)).
93. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 263–65 (2005) (condemning a Dallas County
District Attorney manual on how to systematically exclude African-Americans from juries that
remained in circulation until at least 1976).
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particularly in death penalty cases.94 In those jurisdictions, prosecutors
were trained that jurors of color would side with the defendant and would
not view the evidence fairly.95 A prosecutor trained that jurors of color
could not fairly hear the evidence, of course, would have an enormous
temptation to ensure that no jurors of color sat on the jury.
For this category of error, trial-level remedies do not incentivize
constitutional compliance, and a robust appellate remedy is needed to
incentivize constitutional compliance. But, as discussed below, because
the Court has only considered the importance of deterring constitutional
violation in the context of the exclusionary rule, it has limited appellate
remedies such that they do not provide an adequate means for deterring
this category of constitutional error.
B. Limitations on Appellate Remedies of Constitutional Error
Because the Court has never considered the importance of deterring
constitutional error in criminal cases outside of the exclusionary rule, it
has never contemplated the importance of appellate remedies for ensuring
compliance with constitutional rights. Instead, when considering
constitutional violations that occur after the start of trial proceedings and
the appointment of counsel, the Court’s remedial scheme has focused
solely on the fairness of the proceedings.96 It therefore has limited
appellate remedies—through the harmless error rule and the Strickland
prejudice standard among others—to constitutional errors affecting the
outcome of proceedings with no consideration of incentives for
constitutional compliance.
Beginning with harmless error, in Chapman v. California,97 the Court
held that most claims of constitutional error can be remedied on appeal
only if there is a reasonable possibility that the constitutional violation
might have contributed to the outcome.98 Or, to phrase it slightly
94. See id. at 264 (noting the District Attorney Office’s “formal policy to exclude minorities
from jury service”).
95. See Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, Notwithstanding
President Obama’s Election, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 267–68 (2010) (discussing the Dallas District
Attorney Office policy at issue in Miller-El and an instructional video used by a District Attorney
in Philadelphia to train prosecutors on how to evade Batson); Former Philadelphia Prosecutor
Accused of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at A14, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/03/
us/former-philadelphia-prosecutor-accused-of-racial-bias.html (quoting the Philadelphia District
Attorney training video that instructed that “blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to
convict” because of “a resentment for law enforcement”).
96. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
97. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
98. Id. at 24; see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the
Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2035–37 (describing the history
of the constitutional harmless error rule). If a defendant fails to object in the trial court to a
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differently, a court will not deem constitutional errors harmless unless the
state establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict.99 At first blush, it appears unlikely that a court
would ever find constitutional errors harmless. After all, requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict
sets a high bar for a finding of harmless error.100
In operation, however, the harmless error doctrine blocks a significant
number of claims of constitutional error. Indeed, one study that examined
cases of criminal defendants who later were exonerated found that
appellate courts in sixteen percent of those cases had previously found
constitutional error but concluded that the error was harmless.101 The
prevalence of court findings of harmless error arises from the fact that the
standard increasingly has moved toward assessing the strength of other
evidence of the defendant’s guilt, rather than evaluating the magnitude of
the constitutional error.102 Thus, regardless how egregious the violation
of the defendant’s constitutional rights, as long as the state has strong
evidence of guilt, a court will deem the error harmless.103
constitutional error, appellate review is even more limited. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 732 (1993) (limiting review of errors that were not objected to during trial to those that
“seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” (quoting
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985))).
99. Of course, states may require reversal of constitutional error even if harmless, but most
jurisdictions adhere to some form of the harmless error rule. See Dennis J. Braithwaite, Coerced
Confessions, Harmless Error: The “Guilty as Hell” Rule in State Courts, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
233, 236 & n.23 (2012) (concluding that most state courts follow the Supreme Court’s harmless
error rule with regard to coerced confessions); Dick R. Schlegel, The Evolution of Harmless Error
in Iowa: Where Do We Go from Here?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 547, 549 (1995) (noting that state
courts, particularly Iowa, follow Chapman’s harmless error rule).
100. The standard for obtaining reversal for non-constitutional error presents a much higher
burden for criminal defendants. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946)
(reiterating that in the context of a non-constitutional violation, the burden is on “the party seeking
a new trial [to show] that any technical errors that he may complain of have affected his substantial
rights” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 913, 65th Cong. 3d Sess., at 1 (1919))).
101. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 108 tbl.8 (2008).
102. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1995) (“The problem with harmless error
arises when we as appellate judges conflate the harmlessness inquiry with our own assessment of
a defendant’s guilt. This approach is dangerously seductive, for our natural inclination is to view
an error as harmless whenever a defendant’s conviction appears well justified by the record
evidence. However, the seductiveness of this approach is its chief defect, for, drawn in by its
attractions, we have applied the harmless-error rule to such an extent that it is my impression that
my colleagues and I are inclined to invoke it almost automatically where the proof of a defendant’s
guilt seems strong.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 58–60 (criticizing the Court for assuming the error was
harmless whenever there is other strong evidence of guilt and arguing that the Court has
effectively placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the error was harmless).
103. See Edwards, supra note 102.
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The harmless error standard does not apply to constitutional errors “so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless
error.”104 But this category of “structural error”—an error that “affect[s]
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error
in the trial process itself”105—is narrow, encompassing only
constitutional violations that both strike at the core of the most
fundamental constitutional rights and defy harmless error analysis.106
Structural errors include Batson violations,107 as well as actual or
constructive denials of counsel, denials of the right to a public trial or the
right to proceed pro se, and denial of the right to an unbiased judge or
jury.108 Violations of precious few other rights have been deemed
structural errors.109
The harmless error doctrine has been the subject of intense criticism
because of the extent to which it curtails the availability of an appellate
remedy for constitutional violations.110 But the Court’s instinct that not
every constitutional violation should result in reversal is
understandable.111 After all, in the absence of a requirement that the
constitutional error in some way affected the result of the proceeding,
even the most trivial of errors would result in reversal. 112 And although
some scholars contend that constitutional errors cannot be trivial,113
104. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
105. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 290–91 (listing the limited categories of structural error and criticizing the
majority for construing structural error so narrowly).
107. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160–61 (2009).
108. See Fairfax, supra note 98, at 2038.
109. See, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–09 (holding that the introduction of a coerced
confession is trial error rather than a structural error and therefore subject to harmless error
analysis); see also Fairfax, supra note 98, at 2038–39 (analyzing Fulminante).
110. See Edwards, supra note 102, at 1169–70; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v.
Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV.
152, 172 (1991) (observing that “even the accused have rights and that only automatic reversal
can fully vindicate such rights”).
111. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3–4 (1970) (describing how
courts used to reverse convictions for the most trivial of errors). For example, Judge Roger
Traynor discusses a case where the appellate court reversed because the indictment charged the
defendant with “larcey” instead of “larceny.” TRAYNOR, supra (discussing People v. St. Clair, 56
Cal. 406 (1880)); cf. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV.
1, 20 (2002) (noting that although the precise content of the harmless error doctrine has been
subject to dispute, “there is near unanimity in support of harmless error as a concept”).
112. See Fairfax, supra note 98, at 2035 (noting that before Chapman, virtually every
constitutional error resulted in reversal of a conviction).
113. See Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine
Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REV. 125, 126, 164–66 (1993) (arguing that harmless
error doctrine should not apply to constitutional errors in the penalty phase of a capital case); Tom
Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 91–92
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requiring a new trial where the constitutional violation was neither
particularly egregious nor particularly harmful to the defendant likely
would not lead to a different outcome for the defendant.
Like the harmless error doctrine, Strickland’s prejudice standard
examines the fairness of the proceeding and the reliability of the outcome
in assessing the availability of a remedy. Under the familiar standard
established in Strickland, a defendant must establish (1) that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2)
a reasonable probability that the errors of counsel led to the outcome.114
As with harmless error, the Court has explained the requirement that the
defendant show prejudice almost entirely with reference to the goal of
ensuring trials that give rise to reliable outcomes: “The purpose of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has
the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
proceeding.”115 And as with harmless error, the Court increasingly has
moved to assessing the strength of the government’s evidence against the
defendant in determining materiality.116
Those similarities aside, Strickland’s prejudice standard presents a
significantly higher bar to relief than the harmless error standard for two
reasons. First, the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice, whereas
the state has the burden of establishing harmless error.117 Second,
prejudice requires that the defendant establish a reasonable probability of
a different result.118 Because the Court has held that courts may consider
the prejudice prong even before finding deficient performance,119
Strickland’s prejudice requirement has come to dominate the law of
ineffective assistance, with courts disposing of the vast majority of
ineffective assistance claims on prejudice grounds.120
(1988) (proposing that reversal should be required whenever the error impairs the purpose of the
relevant constitutional right or when reversal is needed for deterrence).
114. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984).
115. Id. at 691–92.
116. See Braithwaite, supra note 99, at 243–44 (noting that many state courts now determine
whether an error was harmless by asking “whether, once erroneously admitted evidence is
excluded, there remains overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s verdict” (quoting Martha
A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A Process in Need of a
Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976))).
117. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
118. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
119. See id. at 697.
120. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425,
427 (1996) (stating that defendants usually have to show prejudice even if counsel was drunk,
asleep, or under the influence of drugs); see also Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws
and Men: An Essay on Justice Marshall’s View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369,
396–97 (1994) (noting that the Strickland framework makes it likely that the issue of counsel’s
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One other arguable difference between harmless error and
Strickland’s prejudice standard deserves mention: the right–remedy
distinction. The Court has been quite clear that the harmless error
standard, which applies across a number of constitutional doctrines,
concerns only the availability of a remedy for constitutional violations.121
In other words, whether the state violated the defendant’s constitutional
rights is distinct whether the error was harmless.122
It is much less clear, however, whether prejudice defines (1) the scope
of the right to effective assistance, (2) the parameters of a Strickland
violation, or (3) the existence of a remedy for violation of the right. In
Strickland itself, the Court held only that a claim of ineffective assistance
requires a showing of prejudice on appeal. Indeed, as the Court put it:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death
sentence has two components. First, the defendant must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.123
Because the first prong of the Strickland inquiry focuses on whether
counsel was acting as the “counsel” required by the Sixth Amendment,124
that prong of the analysis appears to focus entirely on whether the
performance does not even arise in most cases); Right to Counsel, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. 497–99, n.1560 (2008) (compiling cases on ineffective assistance of counsel); Martin C.
Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward A Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L. J. 413, 455 (1988) (noting that courts rejected
43.3% of all unsuccessful ineffective assistance of counsel claims studied solely for lack of
prejudice).
121. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21–24, 49 (applying for the first time harmless
error analysis to constitutional violations); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)
(reminding courts that apart from a very limited class, those that affect “substantial rights,”
constitutional errors must be disregarded if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Rose
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578–79 (1986) (stating that almost all errors must go through harmless
error analysis).
122. The Court has made clear that courts can assess the issue of harm before deciding whether
there in fact was constitutional error, but the two inquiries remain separate. See Edwards, supra note
102, at 1182 (noting that sometimes courts openly decline to decide whether a defendant’s rights
have been violated by determining that any arguable violation is harmless).
123. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
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defendant received the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. After all, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. The only question, then, would
be whether the deprivation of that right entitles the defendant to a remedy,
i.e., whether the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the
defendant.
To be sure, the Court in Strickland defined violation of the right to
counsel in terms of prejudice: “[A]ny deficiencies in counsel’s
performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute
ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”125 But it appears
nonsensical to assert that a defendant who has established deficient
performance—that counsel “made errors so serious” counsel did not
provide the assistance required by the Sixth Amendment—has not
established a violation of that right.126 In any event, regardless whether
the state’s disregard of the right to counsel constitutes a violation of the
defendant’s right without a remedy or is instead a deprivation of a
constitutional right that does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, the parameters of defendants’ constitutional rights in this
context appear clear.
C. The Importance of Remedies for Deterring Invisible, Cost-Effective
Constitutional Error
The Court’s failure to consider the importance of incentivizing
constitutional compliance outside of the exclusionary rule context has
led, in certain jurisdictions, to patterns of intentional, invisible
constitutional error—particularly the failure to provide effective
assistance of counsel.127 The traditional framework fails to assure that the
system operates within constitutional constraints because these errors
cannot be corrected at the trial level and instead require a showing on
125. Id. at 692.
126. See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1–2, 11 (recognizing that defendants
presumably have a right to effective assistance of counsel but that the toothless Strickland test
dilutes that right); see also Joan Stumpf, Case Note, Criminal Law—A New Standard for
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims—Commonwealth v. Pierce, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 515, 521,
537–38 (1988) (recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel but criticizing the
Strickland prejudice prong as subordinating it to the right to a fair trial). But see Sanjay K.
Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1,
35–36 (2009) (stating that Strickland currently requires prejudice as an element of a Sixth
Amendment violation but that the Court has recently shown willingness to separate the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel from the Due Process-based prejudice
showing).
127. See Anderson, supra note 90, at 421–22 (noting that Florida and Colorado have passed
laws that “effectively legislate around the Sixth Amendment”).
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appeal or habeas of a violation of the defendant’s fair trial rights. For
these errors, then, the system incentivizes hiding errors.
Before examining instances of systematic Strickland violations,
however, this Section reviews the operation of Batson’s remedies to
demonstrate that remedies for widespread constitutional violations deter
blatantly deliberate violations of constitutional rights. Prior to Batson,
some jurisdictions could (and did) train prosecutors to strike jurors solely
on the basis of race with no repercussion.128 Batson, of course, both held
unconstitutional juror strikes motivated by race and, importantly, also
held that such strikes constitute “structural error” that does not require
the defendant to show harmless error.129 In addition, because the Court
has determined that evidence that a prosecutor’s office consistently
engaged in discriminatory conduct can help establish its discriminatory
motive,130 prosecutors’ offices now have reason to fear that courts will
overturn convictions, regardless of the strength of the evidence against
the defendant, if the office (1) has a policy (formal or informal) endorsing
the violation of this right, or (2) engages in a pattern of striking jurors of
color.131
As a result, prosecutors now have an incentive to avoid systematically
and blatantly violating Batson. Of course, this does not mean that Batson
is respected in every case.132 Instead, it means that prosecutors’ offices
can no longer have policies of training their lawyers to violate Batson,
and they also have good cause to worry about establishing patterns of
striking jurors of color absent good reasons. Allegations of Batson
violations still occur,133 but allegations of more recent Batson violations
appear to involve allegations of more nuanced violations.134 To put it
another way, the Batson remedy prevents the most blatant violations.
128. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-Batson circulation of
both a manual that advocated for the systematic exclusion of African Americans at the Dallas
County District Attorney’s Office and a comparable instructional video in Philadelphia).
129. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986); see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S.
148, 153, 160–61 (2009) (noting that Batson errors are structural and not subject to harmless error
review).
130. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 253 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 346–47 (2003).
131. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
132. Professor Albert Alschuler describes the indisputable impact of Batson on prosecutors’
offices despite its numerous “loopholes.” See Alschuler, supra note 68, at 374–75.
133. See id. at 374.
134. See, e.g., Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a Batson
violation where the prosecutor noted the race of each venire member he struck from the jury pool);
Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1078–80 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a prima facie case of racial
discrimination when the prosecutor struck two African Americans and four Hispanics because the
strikes could be analyzed together to raise an inference of discrimination). But see Bond v. Beard,
539 F.3d 256, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a video instructing prosecutors on how to take
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Batson’s deterrence of at least the most blatant violations contrasts
with the lack of any incentive to comply with Strickland.135 After all,
states can hide ineffectiveness of defense counsel with the assurance that
a court is extremely unlikely to overturn a conviction. As a result, at least
a few jurisdictions have tailored constitutional compliance to the
likelihood that a court will reverse the conviction on appeal, rather than
respecting the constitutional rights of defendants.136 The incentive
structure for states raises virtually no chance that a court will reverse a
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel. This is because there is
only a minimal chance that a defendant will actually raise ineffective
assistance on appeal, and, if the claim is raised, it is extremely unlikely
that a court will find counsel’s errors prejudicial.137 The probability of
both of these events happening is exceedingly minimal.138 This is so for
race into account but circumvent Batson did not show a pattern of discrimination because the
general office policy was to comply with Batson); United States v. Moreno, 217 F.3d 592, 594
(8th Cir. 2000) (finding no Batson violation where the defendant was Mexican American and the
prosecutor struck the only Mexican American from the jury because another Hispanic American
did serve on the jury and the prosecutor gave a race-neutral reason); McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d
288, 292–94 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding no Batson violation when the prosecutor struck a higher
percentage of African Americans than the percentage of African Americans in the venire because
this amounted to only two African Americans, and the prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons).
135. Defendants’ right under Brady to disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the hands of
prosecutors provides another example of invisible constitutional error. Prosecutors have every
incentive to hide exculpatory material from defendants at trial, and Brady’s materiality standard
precludes most defendants from obtaining a reversal. The New Orleans District Attorneys’ Office
under former-District Attorney Harry Connick provides perhaps the clearest example. See Adam
Liptak, $14 Million Jury Award to Ex-Inmate Is Dismissed, NY TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/us/30scotus.html.
136. See Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Envisioning Post-Conviction Review for the
Twenty-First Century, 78 MISS. L.J. 433, 438 (2008) (noting that post-conviction litigation focuses
on mistakes of counsel rather than the merit of constitutional claims).
137. This Article recognizes it is unlikely that local or state legislatures’ actions are this
deliberate. If, however, local legislatures believed that convictions would be overturned because
they were not adequately funding indigent defenders, funding undoubtedly would increase.
138. There are no existing statistics on the possibility of a felony conviction leading to a
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but the existing data strongly suggest that the
chance of a felony case being reversed on appeal ranges from slim to none. In 2008, for instance,
there were a total of thirty-five published federal court decisions (either at the district court or
appellate level) finding ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct appeal or on habeas
motions. See TERESA L. NORRIS, SUMMARIES OF PUBLISHED SUCCESSFUL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIMS POST-WIGGINS V. SMITH (2013), https://www.capdefnet.org/hat/uploadedFile
s/Public/Helpful_Cases/Ineffective_Assistance_of_Counsel/IAC%20PostWiggins%2072613.pdf
(compiling and summarizing successful, published ineffective assistance of counsel cases). In that
same year, there were 76,572 felony convictions in federal court alone. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 231822, 2008- STATISTICAL TABLES
tbl.4.2., http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/tables/fjs08st402.pdf. Suffice it to say
that successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims are rare.
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a couple of reasons. First, most defendants plead guilty,139 and many
either waive their right to appeal or have no basis for an appeal after their
pleas.140 Second, the chance that a defendant can establish prejudice on
appeal constitutes an almost nonexistent threat.141 States therefore have
little cause for concern that defendants’ convictions will be overturned
for ineffective assistance.
Infringements of the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel, moreover, are widespread because of the very real financial
pressures states face. Unlike the vast majority of constitutional rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants, the right to counsel requires
significant expenditures by the state (and in many jurisdictions also the
county or the city).142 Good lawyers often cost more than bad lawyers, if
for no other reason than that they actually spend the necessary time on
each case.143 States, of course, have every incentive to provide the
cheapest representation they can find, regardless of the quality. This is
particularly true given that criminal defendants have at most little (and
139. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 215646, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS,
2004 at 1 (2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (indicating that ninety-five
percent of felony convictions in state courts were the result of a guilty plea in 2004).
140. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011) (“[B]ecause most guilty pleas waive
defendants’ rights to appeal, few typical guilty-plea cases ever reach[ ] the Supreme Court.”);
Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss,
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2087–95 (2000) (noting that courts
usually uphold plea bargain waivers of the right to appeal); J. Peter Veloski, Comment, Bargain
for Justice or Face the Prison of Privileges? The Ethical Dilemma in Plea Bargain Waivers of
Collateral Relief, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 429, 430 (2014) (noting that it is common for defendants to
waive their rights to appeal in plea bargains, even before they know what sentence they will
receive).
141. Establishing prejudice from counsel’s conduct during a guilty plea is even more
complicated than in a post-trial situation because the defendant must establish that the defendant
would not have pleaded guilty absent counsel’s errors. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes,
Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
697, 737–39 (2002) (noting that even if defense counsel were required to inform clients about the
collateral consequences of guilty pleas under the performance prong, it would be difficult for the
defendant to establish he would not have taken the plea anyway).
142. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1866–70, 1883 (1994) (arguing that the
inadequacy of counsel for the poor is partially due to most state governments’ unwillingness to
pay for it); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 89, at 1480 (criticizing the Gideon Court for failing to
acknowledge the enormous financial burden it placed on the states and, thus, failing to make clear
that the Court expected “more than a cosmetic adherence to its ruling”).
143. This Article recognizes that this often is not true. Indeed, experienced public defenders
often prove more cost-effective than other lawyers. But experienced and responsible lawyers will
not accept the caseloads required in some jurisdictions because they recognize that they cannot
responsibly do so.
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very likely no) voice or power in the matter because states set their own
budgets.
As a result, in many jurisdictions across the country, legislators expect
public defenders to manage caseloads so excessive that they cannot
possibly provide constitutionally adequate representation to all of their
clients. This problem has been exhaustively and comprehensively
documented in many reports and articles.144 The American Bar
Association and many advocates have worked to enact caseload standards
that would limit criminal defense lawyers to handling 150 felony cases
per year or 400 misdemeanor cases.145 In light of those standards, one
example suffices to demonstrate the excessive caseload point. In
testimony before the ABA given in 2004, the Executive Director of the
New York State Defenders Association said: “Caseloads are radically out
of whack in some places in New York. There are caseloads per year in
which a lawyer handles 1,000, 1,200, 1,600 cases.”146 A lawyer working
eight hours per day every weekday with no vacation for fifty-two weeks
has 2080 hours of work time per year. That lawyer would have just over
an hour to devote to each of her 1600 clients, assuming she spent her
business day working directly on those clients’ cases rather than on any
administrative tasks. Given those statistics—and the fact that even one
client who chooses to go to trial requires a lot of court time, in addition
to investigation time—a public defender with that caseload could not
possibly meet the constitutional standard in every case.
But these jurisdictions have no incentive to spend money on indigent
defense in the absence of a costly consequence. And because remedies
on appeal provide no incentive to comply, states have every incentive to
shirk these constitutional rights. The critical question, then, is whether
the system currently provides any other remedies to motivate
constitutional compliance.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF OTHER REMEDIES TO DETER INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
If other review mechanisms ensured constitutional compliance, then
remedies on direct criminal appeal for violations of these invisible errors
144. See sources cited supra notes 90–91; see also Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources
for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 235–36 (2004)
(recognizing the caseload crisis and advocating for caseload parity between defense counsel and
prosecutors).
145. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COURTS,
STANDARD 13.12 (1973), http://www.nasams.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Standards_For_
The_Defense. These standards have been criticized for requiring public defenders to accept too
many cases, but suffice it to say that even these standards are not being met.
146. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 92.
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would be unnecessary.147 But the alternative mechanisms for remediating
constitutional harm—the federal and state habeas and constitutional tort
statutes—restrict remedies even more drastically than direct review of
convictions. And the ethical rules, which in theory give lawyers and
judges at least some incentive to comply with the commands of the
Constitution, turn out to be toothless tigers.
The Court has recognized that other potential remedies could provide
sufficient incentives for complying with the Constitution. The four
remedies most likely to provide incentives for constitutional compliance
are (1) the post-conviction habeas remedy available in federal courts to
defendants alleging violations of their constitutional rights at some stage
of the proceedings leading to conviction;148 (2) federal tort actions,
primarily the § 1983 civil damages remedies for violation of
constitutional rights;149 (3) state habeas and tort remedies; and (4) the
ethical rules governing the conduct of lawyers.150 If any of these remedies
provided significant relief for constitutional violations, they arguably
could provide an incentive for constitutional conduct.151 But none does.
A. The Federal Habeas Remedy
Beginning with the habeas remedy, the Judiciary Act of 1789
provided an equitable remedy to prisoners “in custody, under or by colour
of the authority of the United States.”152 In keeping with English law, this
statute authorized relief from confinement where the court imposing
confinement lacked jurisdiction or where the Executive had detained the
prisoner without legal process.153 In 1867, Congress authorized federal
147. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–97 (2006) (holding that the exclusionary
rule remedy for knock and announce violations is not a necessary deterrent because of the
availability of the § 1983 remedy for such violations).
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)–(c), 2254–55 (2012).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Rudovsky, supra note 71, at 1207–09.
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.1, 8.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
151. The Constitution does not appear to require any of these remedies (except the very
limited Bivens remedy), so all of the other remedies have been either enacted by a legislature or
passed by state bar associations. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is
There A Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV.
862, 908 (1994).
152. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. As other scholars note, the federal
statutory habeas remedy merely supplemented the common law habeas remedy available in state
courts, and even post-Erie, the federal courts also for many years created a federal “common law”
of habeas. See, e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF
LIBERTY 3 (2001); Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas and the Separation of Powers, 95
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 43–45 (2010). As discussed below, many of the federal habeas
gatekeeping bars initially arose as part of that common law tradition.
153. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 486–87 & n.120
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courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in state (as well as
federal) custody.154 As a result, criminal defendants convicted in either
state or federal proceedings have an opportunity to seek a remedy in
federal court to correct federal constitutional errors that occurred during
the proceedings in their cases.155
The habeas statute in theory could provide a powerful tool for
ensuring that state actors respect the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants. As the Court itself has recognized, however, the habeas
remedy is so attenuated from constitutional violations that it does not
affect the conduct of law enforcement officers.156 Perhaps more to the
point, the habeas statutes pose such significant limitations on relief that it
is extremely unlikely that the remedy does anything to alter the conduct
of state actors.
The federal habeas statutes completely preclude relief for a variety of
reasons.157 For instance, if the applicant fails to raise his claim within one
year of the judgment, the federal court cannot grant relief.158 Similarly,
the defendant must present his constitutional claim to the state courts,
(1963); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2041–42 (1992); Emily Garcia Uhrig, A
Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 575 (2009).
154. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see also McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 478
(citing and explaining the Act of Feb. 5).
155. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)–(c), 2254–55 (2012).
156. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 (1976) (holding that as long as the state
provided full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claim, the habeas statute provides
no relief for Fourth Amendment violations because the remedy is too far removed from the
original violation to provide deterrence).
157. In addition to the limitations listed below, the statute precludes relief if the applicant
raises the claim in a second or subsequent application for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)–(b),
and if the applicant failed to exhaust state remedies for the error. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A) (“An
application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless . . . the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .”).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 419 (2005) (holding
that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) statute of limitations bars a
habeas petition that a petitioner files beyond the deadline and that is not entitled to any tolling);
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 216–17 (2002) (determining that the one-year limit does not
include time between issuance of the lower court opinion and filing of notice to appeal to a higher
court for the AEDPA). There are limited exceptions to this bar, including the equitable tolling
doctrine and the discovery of new evidence that the petitioner could not previously have
discovered. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933–34 (2013) (holding that evidence
that shows “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the
petitioner]” may bypass the statute of limitations (alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995))); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (holding that the
AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases). However,
applicants are rarely successful arguing these exceptions. See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of
an Execution: Fairness v. “Process,” 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 317 n.21 (1999) (observing that at
the time of writing, the author could find no cases that had successfully argued this exception).
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otherwise it is deemed waived.159 If the state defendant does timely raise
a claim that the state courts considered and denied, the court cannot grant
relief unless the applicant can establish that the state court committed an
error that
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or . . . in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.160
As others have documented, this standard presents a significant obstacle
to applicants’ chances of succeeding on any claim.161 The wisdom of each
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012)
(noting that under the procedural default rules, “a federal court will not review the merits of
claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner
failed to abide by a state procedural rule”); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000)
(discussing the procedural default doctrine generally). The procedural default bar can be excused
if the applicant can establish both cause for the default and prejudice from the failure to consider
his claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (restating the cause and prejudice
standard of review of alleged violations of federal law in habeas proceedings); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86–87 (1977) (holding that the state procedural default doctrine barred federal
habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice for the default). Suffice it to say that the
cause and prejudice standard affords only the narrowest exception to the procedural default bar.
See Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 957–59 (2000); Ruthann Robson & Michael Mello, Ariadne’s
Provisions: A “Clue of Thread” to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Adequate and
Independent State Grounds, and Florida’s Death Penalty, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 96–97 (1988).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (holding that
before a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner, the applicant must
show either that the state court adjudication “(1) ‘was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or (2) ‘involved an unreasonable
application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States’” (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012)); see also Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (stating that “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” have
independent meanings under AEDPA).
161. See, e.g., NANCY J. KING, ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY) 6 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf (providing statistics
on defenses); John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259,
292–93 (2006) (arguing that there is uncertainty surrounding the application of these claims); John
H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 435, 475–77 (2011) (highlighting how the complexity and unyielding nature of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) encourages dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims); Kenneth Williams, The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN.
L. REV. 919, 926–28 (2001) (objecting to courts’ application of § 2254).
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of these limitations is hotly contested,162 but, wise or not, they continue
to limit the availability of a habeas remedy in federal court, and as a
result, they limit the extent to which the potential availability of a habeas
remedy influences the conduct of state actors.163
One additional barrier exists to limit the capacity for the habeas
remedy to set incentives for state actors. In many jurisdictions, elected
district attorneys for the local jurisdiction or county prosecute criminal
defendants,164 but the state’s attorney general’s office represents the state
in federal habeas actions.165 The fact that the state actor making decisions
at the defendant’s criminal trial does not represent the state in any
subsequent habeas action dilutes the impact of any deterrent effect
provided by the habeas remedy. As a result, the federal habeas remedy
provides little, if any, incentive for state actors to respect the
Constitution.166
B. Section 1983 Federal Tort Remedies
Like the federal habeas remedy, the federal tort remedy provided by
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide much incentive for constitutional
conduct by government actors. Passed over a century ago as part of the
Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress intended for § 1983 to provide a federal tort
remedy for plaintiffs whose federal constitutional rights have been
violated by state or local government employees.167 But like the federal
162. See Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in
Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 771–73 (2002); see also Larry W.
Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 541, 555–56 (2006) (discussing AEDPA’s controversial infringement on the jurisdictional
power of federal courts in habeas proceedings).
163. Professor Nancy King reports that the overall grant rate for non-capital cases is about
one in every 341 cases filed. See KING ET AL., supra note 161, at 52.
164. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV.
69, 75–76 (2011) (discussing the history of the locally elected prosecutor in the United States);
William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1343–44
(1993); Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1530
(2012).
165. See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 27 (2002).
166. See KING ET AL., supra note 161, at 51 (showing that in non-capital cases, only 0.29%
of all federal habeas cases brought received relief).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (giving citizens the right to bring suit against “[e]very person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 483–84, 486 (1982) (tracing the
history of § 1983 from creation through modern Supreme Court interpretations); Steven L. Winter,
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habeas remedy, § 1983 has significant limitations that prevent it from
providing an incentive for constitutional compliance.168
To prevail on a § 1983 claim for damages, the plaintiff must show,
fundamentally, that the state violated his constitutional rights and that the
constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
violation.169 If these were the only requirements for the § 1983 remedy,
it arguably could provide an incentive for state actors to comply with the
Constitution because it would require that state actors be aware of
constitutional law and comply with clearly established rights.170
But the Court has also held that a § 1983 damages remedy for
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment is cognizable only if the
defendant can establish either that his conviction has been reversed on
The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 333–34 (1992) (attempting to
define the scope of the phrase “under the color of law” within the context of § 1983).
Additionally, there is one other federal tort remedy for constitutional violations committed
by federal (as opposed to state) employees. Although § 1983 does not provide a remedy for
constitutional violations by federal officers, the Court has held that federal prisoners seeking
redress for constitutional violations by federal officers may have a remedy. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that the
petitioner stated a cause of action and was entitled to recover civil damages for federal agents’
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights). The Bivens remedy, however, has been limited even
more significantly than any remedy available under § 1983. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct.
617, 621–22 (2012) (discussing the three narrow situations in which the Bivens remedy extends—
warrantless searches, the Eighth Amendment right to medical treatment, and alleged sexual
harassment by a federal employee). Bivens, therefore, does not provide an incentive for
constitutional compliance in criminal cases outside of very limited situations.
168. Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (finding that “[e]xcept for the two relatively small
classes of cases, voting rights and accommodations, the data show a uniformly low success rate
at trial across all categories of civil rights and prisoner cases” and that “success rates for the large
categories (civil rights, employment discrimination, prisoner civil rights) are far below reported
trial success rates for most other litigation”); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality
of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 677 (1987) (finding based on empirical
data that “constitutional tort plaintiffs do significantly worse than non-civil rights litigants in every
measurable way”).
169. See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (using Harlow’s “clearly established”
analysis in a § 1983 action); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“If the law at that
time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct
not previously identified as unlawful.”).
170. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19 (“If the law was clearly established, the immunity
defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law
governing his conduct.”); Allen H. Denson, Neither Clear Nor Established: The Problem with
Objective Legal Reasonableness, 59 ALA. L. REV. 747, 756 (2008) (“In order to achieve the
socially desirable goal of deterring future violations by providing guidance to public officials,
while at the same time not holding officials liable for violating constitutional rights in novel
situations, constitutional rights must be recognizable in a more useful sense.”).
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direct appeal or has otherwise been declared invalid. As the Court put it
in Heck v. Humphrey171:
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages
actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the
unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has
always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.
. . . .[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.172
As discussed above, obtaining a reversal on appeal or a remedy on habeas
presents serious obstacles.173
There is one sense in which § 1983 could provide a remedy—
injunctive relief may be available to criminal defendants facing
representation by public defenders with astronomically high caseloads.174
But the outside possibility that injunctive relief may be available to
criminal defendants who are not receiving adequate representation
provides little incentive for jurisdictions to comply with their obligations
to provide effective assistance of counsel. After all, at worst, they will be
required to come into compliance with no other penalty.175
The § 1983 remedy, then, stands as a poor mechanism for ensuring
constitutional compliance. To be sure, the Court could modify the
requirement that § 1983 plaintiffs establish reversal of their convictions,
thereby providing greater incentive for constitutional compliance. But the
value of tort remedies, even if not subject to the limitations discussed
above, in incentivizing constitutional compliance has significant
171. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
172. Id. at 486–87 (internal citations omitted).
173. See supra Part II and Section III.A.
174. A district court in Washington recently found that injunctive relief was available in this
situation. See Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1133–34 (W.D. Wash.
2013).
175. In Wilbur, the district court’s injunctive relief included an order to hire a part-time
“public defense supervisor” to oversee the offending public defenders’ efforts to come into
compliance with the Sixth Amendment, but no other penalty. Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1134–
37.
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limitations. This is so because the actors making decisions resulting in
constitutional infringements generally cannot be held liable.176 Thus,
§ 1983 does not, and cannot, provide an incentive for constitutional
compliance.
C. State Habeas and Tort Remedies
Every state has a post-conviction remedy to correct federal
constitutional errors.177 As with the remedies described above, if state
habeas were routinely available to correct any federal constitutional
errors, it could serve as a powerful incentive for constitutional
compliance. The habeas remedy in most states, however, has limitations
similar to (and in some cases even more restrictive than) those applicable
on federal habeas.
The Court has held that the Constitution does not require states to
provide post-conviction remedies for violations of constitutional
rights,178 but the constitutions of every state afford such a remedy.179 The
habeas rules in at least some states vary from the federal rules, and the
Court has held that federal habeas limitations do not necessarily prevent
states from construing their habeas remedies differently.180 That fact
notwithstanding, a number of states incorporate bars to relief that are
similar to the federal habeas limitations.181 Indeed, some states have
imposed more significant limitations to the habeas remedy than those

176. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that public defenders do
not act “under color of law” for § 1983 purposes); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31
(1976) (holding that absolute immunity protects prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–
55 (1967) (holding that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits under § 1983).
177. Jennifer N. Ide, The Case of Exzavious Lee Gibson: A Georgia Court’s
(Constitutional?) Denial of a Federal Right, 47 EMORY L.J. 1079, 1093 (1998). The last state to
recognize a state habeas remedy was Alaska. See Application of House for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 352 P.2d 131, 133, 135 (Alaska 1960) (stating that the court’s habeas authority derived
from the Alaska Statehood Act).
178. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (“State collateral proceedings are
not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a different
and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal.”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief . . . .”).
179. Ide, supra note 177, at 1093.
180. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275, 282 (2008) (holding that states are not
required to follow the Court’s rule barring application of new procedural constitutional rules to
cases on habeas review).
181. See, e.g., DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 3-2, at 191 (2001 ed.) (noting that at the time of writing, thirty-one
states had a statute of limitations on their primary post-conviction remedy).
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facing habeas applicants in federal court.182 Thus, although the state
habeas remedy may provide a slightly more significant deterrent effect
than federal habeas in several jurisdictions, overall it provides little in the
way of additional incentive to comply with constitutional norms beyond
the deterrent value of appellate remedies.
The Court also has lauded the deterrent value of state tort remedies for
federal constitutional violations.183 But, like the § 1983 remedy, state tort
remedies have demanding requirements that frequently act as a barrier to
relief.184 And as with the § 1983 remedy, states do not appear to permit
recovery unless the plaintiff can establish that a court overturned his
conviction on appeal or on habeas.185 As a result, the exceedingly slim
chance of a state tort remedy likely has little to no impact on the conduct
of state officers.
D. Ethical Rules Governing Lawyers and Judges
The empirical evidence on compliance with the exclusionary rule
primarily documents the responsiveness of law enforcement officers to
remedies, while lawyers (including judges) have responsibility for
ensuring compliance with Strickland. Lawyers, unlike law enforcement
officers, have ethical obligations to follow the Constitution.186 As a
realistic matter, however, ethical rules governing lawyers and judges
provide little to no additional incentive to protect defendants’
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.187

182. See Ide, supra note 177, at 1094–97; WILKES, supra note 181, § 1-12, at 51 (noting that
twelve states do not treat newly discovered evidence of innocence as grounds for relief under their
post-conviction remedy).
183. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2012) (“State tort law . . . can help to deter
constitutional violations as well as to provide compensation to a violation’s victim.”).
184. See Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1449, 1511 (2009) (noting the inadequacy of state tort law remedies because state law claims
“are subject to state common law and statutory defenses, some of which may be inapplicable or
preempted in § 1983 actions”).
185. WILKES, supra note 181, § 1-6, at 31.
186. Every state has a set of ethical rules governing the conduct of lawyers and judges. See
AM. BAR ASS’N, STATUS OF STATE REVIEW OF PROFESSION CONDUCT RULES (2011), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_status_chart.authcheckdam.pdf.
The precise content of the rules varies somewhat from state to state, but all require compliance
with the Constitution. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(a) (2004) (citing the duty of an
attorney to support the Constitution and laws of the United States); MICH. RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT 1.2(d) (2015) (“When . . . a client expects assistance not permitted by . . . law, the
lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations . . . .”); TEX. DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT pmbl. 3 (2005) (“[A] lawyer should zealously pursue clients’ interests
within the bounds of the law.”).
187. This is precisely Professor Alschuler’s point. See Alschuler, supra note 68, at 374–75.
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As an initial matter, although the ethical rules may provide at least
some incentive for defense counsel to comply with their constitutional
obligations, public defenders operating in systems in which they (and
their colleagues) routinely carry overwhelmingly excessive caseloads
may neither realize the ways in which their representation is deficient nor
view it as out of the ordinary. Instead, those defenders operate in triage
mode, simply lacking sufficient time to provide effective assistance to all
of their clients.188 To put it simply, those lawyers lack the resources to
worry about ethical rules, let alone comply with them.
Even if those lawyers recognize that they lack the power to control
their caseloads, legislators, not defense lawyers, decide the budgets for
public defenders, and those budgets determine caseloads.189 Indeed, some
jurisdictions have passed legislation prohibiting public defenders from
withdrawing from cases on the grounds that they have excessive
caseloads.190
The bottom line is that none of the alternative mechanisms for
ensuring constitutional compliance—state or federal habeas remedies,
state or federal tort remedies, or the ethical rules—comes close to
deterring unconstitutional conduct by government actors. As a result, the
primary mechanism for deterrence remains the constitutional remedy at
trial or on appeal.
IV. REMEDIES TO MOTIVATE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE
The current remedial scheme does not create adequate incentives for
constitutional compliance with rights that (1) can be surreptitiously
violated, and (2) carry a high cost to comply. The result is systematic
constitutional violations of those rights in at least some jurisdictions.191
Batson and Strickland represent the paradigmatic examples, although
others likely exist. Of course, not all jurisdictions violate these
constitutional rights. Indeed, most respect them. The point is that at least
some do not.
To provide an incentive for jurisdictions to comply with high-cost
constitutional rights like ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
therefore should provide remedies for violations of this category of rights
in cases in which the defendant can establish a pattern or custom of
188. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 821–22 (2004) (arguing that public defenders have
to perform a triage function and focus only on certain cases because they lack the time to focus
on all of them).
189. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 90, at 421–22.
190. See id. at 421–22, 429–30 (noting that Florida and Colorado have passed such
legislation).
191. See supra Section II.C.
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constitutional violations by the government. Thus, if a defendant can
establish both that the state did not comply with his constitutional rights
and that the state has a custom or pattern of intentional disregard for that
particular constitutional right, the defendant would be entitled to reversal.
This remedy essentially would treat patterns or customs of intentional
disregard for the constitutional right as structural error, thereby relieving
defendants of the obligation to establish harm from the error.192
The Batson remedy provides a helpful model in two ways. First, as
the Court has recognized, although proving discriminatory intent often
proves challenging, evidence that a jurisdiction had a “general policy” of
excluding black venire members from juries helps establish
discriminatory intent.193 Thus, evidence that in the decade before the
defendant’s trial, Dallas County, Texas distributed a training document
advising prosecutors of the importance of striking people of color from
the jury venire provided persuasive evidence of discriminatory intent in
the exercise of peremptory strikes.194 Second, proof of intentional
discrimination is structural error leading to automatic reversals regardless
of the strength of evidence against the defendant.195 Thus, prosecutors’
offices have a significant incentive to avoid systematic, intentional
violations of Batson.196

192. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986) (treating as structural error claims
that the state engaged in intentional discrimination in the exercise of preemptory strikes).
193. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334–35 (2003) (documenting the pattern or
practice of discrimination in Dallas County). The standard for establishing a “policy” under
Batson appears to be similar to that required to establish a custom of constitutional violations
sufficient to give rise to municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). See, e.g., Baron v.
Suffolk Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 402 F.3d 225, 240–42 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a prison guard
sufficiently established the county’s custom of violating the First Amendment by retaliating
against guards who reported colleagues through testimony that the guard was disciplined for his
reports and evidence from a prison official that the prison had a “code of silence” that “could”
have consequences for those who violated it). Circuits differ on the precise standard required to
establish a “custom.” In particular, there is a circuit split regarding whether multiple violations
against the same plaintiff can constitute a custom or whether, instead, there must be instances of
multiple violations against different people. Compare id. at 237, 239 (holding that allegations of
specific violations against one plaintiff could be sufficient), with Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d
588, 594–95 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff alleging failure to protect had to
establish that the government had a widespread practice of failing to adequately protect inmates).
194. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 334–35. To be sure, as discussed above, proving Batson
violations presents real challenges even with evidence of a general policy of discrimination. But
that evidence certainly helps establish intentional discrimination.
195. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161–62 (noting that Batson errors are structural
and are not subject to harmless error review).
196. Id.
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Intentional, systematic violations of Strickland cry out for a similar
remedy to provide incentives for constitutional compliance.197
Jurisdictions nationwide set their budgets for public defender offices
without regard to whether those lawyers can meet their constitutional
obligations.198 Because these jurisdictions recognize that courts will not
reverse convictions based upon otherwise sufficient evidence, even for
blatant violations of the right to the effective assistance of counsel,
jurisdictions can, and at least sometimes do, gamble on the extremely
unlikely probability of reversal.
Under these unique circumstances—a defendant (1) asserts a difficult
to detect infringement of a high-cost constitutional right, and (2) presents
evidence of an intentional custom or pattern of conduct by the state
infringing on that constitutional right—the existing remedies for criminal
defendants are insufficient to ensure that states comply with their
constitutional obligations. Constitutional compliance therefore requires a
more robust appellate remedy. Thus, courts should “presume” Strickland
prejudice upon a showing that a jurisdiction had a practice of underfunding indigent defense so drastically that it would be impossible for
lawyers to effectively represent all of their clients.199 Of course,
defendants still would have to establish deficient performance by their
lawyers, i.e., “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.”200 But upon a showing of deficient performance, prejudice
would be presumed if the defendant could establish that the jurisdiction
had a custom or pattern of providing counsel who do not—and cannot—
function as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.
Nor would such a presumption of prejudice be unprecedented. The
Court already has recognized certain exceptions to the prejudice

197. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
45, 93 (2005) (observing that although the conviction reversal remedy might not provide an
incentive for low-level prosecutors to comply with the Constitution, “[c]onviction reversals may
be particularly appropriate in situations where the misconduct involved stems from internal
policies and procedures that require modification through top-down change. For instance, where
the misconduct is found to be a product of inadequate training or supervision, or where the
offending prosecutor is found to have acted in accordance with internal agency policies, an
inherently personal sanction will not inspire agency-wide change”).
198. See Anderson, supra note 90, at 422.
199. See supra Section II.A (setting forth patterns of excessive caseloads in jurisdictions
around the country and the difficulties arising from those caseloads).
200. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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requirements that focus on the blameworthiness of the state’s conduct.201
For instance, the Court has recognized that Strickland prejudice can be
presumed where the trial court requires the defendant to proceed with a
lawyer who has an actual conflict of interest,202 and where, although the
state provided a lawyer, the lawyer could not provide effective
assistance.203 Presuming prejudice from intentional patterns of
constitutional non-compliance therefore has precedent.
To be sure, requiring defendants to establish a deliberate pattern of
violations creates a difficult burden of proof (just as proving Batson
discriminatory intent presents challenges). And if jurisdictions believe
that there is no chance that a defendant will be entitled to relief, this
standard will not provide an incentive for constitutional compliance. But
two factors tailor this remedy to creating a stronger incentive for
constitutional compliance. First, this remedy focuses almost entirely on
the conduct of the state, rather than the evidence against the defendant.
As a result, it provides states with incentives to ensure that their conduct
falls outside of the deliberate custom standard. Second, and of particular
importance, the stakes of walking too close to the constitutional line (or,
in the words of the Court, “tacking too close to the wind”) are incredibly
high.204 After all, once one defendant has established a pattern or custom
of deliberate violations, all other defendants in that jurisdiction have a
right to reversal upon a showing of a constitutional deprivation of that
right. Jurisdictions therefore have an incentive to err on the side of
constitutional caution.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s scheme of remedies provides incentives for compliance
with most constitutional rights. But for high-cost, low-risk-of-reversal
rights such as Strickland, the Court’s remedial scheme does not provide
sufficient incentives to deter unconstitutional conduct. The result has
been deliberate and systematic infringements on the constitutional rights
of defendants in at least some jurisdictions. Unfortunately, those
constitutional infringements likely will not end without some incentive
201. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678–80 & n.9 (1985) (observing that
the state’s deliberate withholding of the fact that its witness has committed perjury is subject to
review for harmless error rather than materiality); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60
(1984) (recognizing that the Court can presume prejudice where, “although counsel is available
to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could
provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without
inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial”).
202. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).
203. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–60.
204. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439–40 (1995) (noting in the context of Brady that
“a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of
evidence. . . . [t]his is as it should be”).
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encouraging constitutional compliance. The Court therefore should
devise a remedy focused on incentivizing constitutional compliance for
these rights. The Constitution demands nothing less.
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